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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
CORPORATIONS ELIGIBLE FOR RELIEF UNDER
SECTION 7731
By LYMAN MARK TONDEL, JR.*
T HE first words of section 77B of the National Bankruptcy
Act provide that "any corporation" may have relief "which
could become a bankrupt under section 4 of this Act," and also
"any railroad or other transportation corporation" except as other-
wise provided.
2
Reference to section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act immediately
reveals that municipal, railroad, insurance, and banking corpora-
tions, and building and loan associations could not become bank-
rupts in either voluntary or involuntary proceedings. Apparently
all other corporations could become voluntary bankrupts. However,
only "moneyed, business, or commercial" corporations, or unincor-
porated companies could be adjudged involuntary bankrupts.3
The question arises whether this same distinction exists under
section 77B, between corporations which are entitled to relief in
voluntary and in involuntary proceedings. The words in section
*Associated with the firm of Root, Clark, Buckner & Ballantine, New
York City.
'For an article dealing at length with this problem, and especially with
the legislative history of the provision, see Weinstein, Corporations Amen-
able to Section 77B, (1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853. This paper is designed
rather to supplement than to duplicate Mr. Weinstein's able discussion. Other
general treatments of the subject may be found in a note in (1936) 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 1111, pp. 1111 to 1114, and in 1 Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations
162-186.2 Section 77B (a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp., 1934), Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207A (Supp. No.
3, 1932-34). It is there provided as follows: "Any corporation which could
become a bankrupt under section 4 of this Act, and any railroad or other
transportation corporation, except a railroad corporation authorized to file
a petition or answer under the provisions of section 77 of this Act, and
except as hereinafter provided, may file an original petition."
sSection 4, as amended, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 22 (Supp. No.
3, 1932-34) found in (1932) 47 Stat. at L. 47, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 22 (Supp.,
1934), it is there provided:
"(a) Any person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, banking cor-
poration, or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt.
"(b) Any natural person, except a wage earner or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company,
and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation (except a mu-
nicipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, or a building and loan
association) owing debts to the amount of $1000 or over, may be adjudged
an involuntary bankrupt. . ."
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77B are "any corporation which could become a bankrupt"4 under
section 4. There is no qualification. The words themselves seem
to indicate that any corporation which could be adjudicated a
bankrupt in either voluntary or involuntary proceedings may have
relief under section 77B.1 The provisions of the Act are, to be
sure, especially adaptable to moneyed stock corporations, but
there is nothing in section 77B which would indicate either that
non-commercial corporations may not be the subjects of invol-
untary proceedings, or that different corporations may be re-
organized in voluntary and involuntary proceedings.
The next question which presents itself is the meaning of the
word "corporations." By the terms of section 77B (k) all pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act, with certain listed exceptions, which
are here immaterial, apply to proceedings instituted under section
77B." Section 1(6) defines "corporations" so as to include "all
bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corpora-
tions not possessed by individuals or partnerships" and especially
"limited or other partnership associations organized under laws
making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of
the association, joint-stock companies, unincorporated companies
and associations, and any business conducted by a trustee, or
trustees, wherein beneficial interest or orership is evidenced by
certificate or other written instrunent."7 The problem is what this
definition includes.
Individuals and partnerships are clearly excluded.8 It has been
4 ltalics added.
!This conclusion was also reached in Weinstein, Corporations Amenable
to Section 77B, (1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853, at 857.
OSection 77B(k), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 921, 11 U. S. C. A.
scc. 207(k) (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(k) (Supp.
No. 3, 1932-34).7The italicized words were added by amendment in 1926. (1926) 44 Stat.
at L. 662, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11,
sec. 1,(Supp. No. 3, 1932-34). Prior to 1926, section 1(6) read: "'corpora-
tions shall mean all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private
corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and shall include
limited or other partnership associations organized under laws making the
capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the association." (1898)
30 Stat. at L. 544, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 1. Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec.
1 (1926).
8In In re North Kenmore Bldg. Corporation, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936)
81 F. (2d) 656, it was held that a petition was not filed in good faith by a
corporation which was organized by two individuals so that they might
avail themselves of relief under section 77B. The court's language in that
case is worthy of note: (p. 657)
". .. another impelling reason exists for holding that this petition
lacks the good faith contemplated by the statute. The original debtor in
this case was not a corporation, but the corporate debtor was subsequently
created for the purpose of permitting a reorganization under a statute per-
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expressly held, under section 77B, that a.partnership is not entitled
to relief.'
Incorporated organizations could file voluntary petitions in
bankruptcy prior to June 7, 1934, even though they were incor-
porated under statutes which allowed the enfranchisement of non-
profit country clubs,"" or benevolent orders,"' and not merely com-
mercial groups. It seems probable that, in the light of these
decisions, "any corporation" will be construed literally at least in
so far as incorporated "corporations" are concerned; that regard-
less of the nature or purpose of the organization it will be allowed
relief under section 77B provided it is not within the express
exceptions in section 77B (a) or section 4.
The chief difficulties will arise with respect to those organiza-
tions which are "neither fish nor fowl," but occupy the middle
ground between partnerships and incorporated "corporations."
The bankruptcy definition of corporations clearly includes a limited
or partnership association, the capital of which is alone respon-
sible for its debts. It also includes what are commonly described
as joint-stock companies.
Massachusetts business trusts are definitely within the scope
of the Act. Prior to the more inclusive amendments of 1926
which expressly extended the bankruptcy definition of "cor-
porations" to include business trusts, 2 such associations were held
to be proper subjects of adjudication on voluntary petitions.' 3 A
mitting certain things to be done in a bankruptcy court by a corporation
that could not be done by individuals. When Congress enacted section 74
(11 U.S.C.A. sec. 202, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 202) to apply to
individuals and sections 77A and 77B (11 U.S.C:A. secs. 206, 207. Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 206, 207) to apply to corporations in similar
circumstances, it was certainly not contemplated that individuals might
clothe themselves in corporate garments for the purpose of taking advantage
of the statutes appertaining thereto, if, in financial extremes, the law re-
specting corporations seemed to afford greater advantages. Had that been
the legislative intent, one statute might well have been made to serve the
double purpose."
Cf. In re Knickerbocker Hotel Co., (C.C.A. 7th cir. 1936) 81 F. (2d)
981, 985.
9In re Poland Union. (D.C. N.Y., Jan. 10, 1935) C. C. H. Bankruptcy
Service, par. 3313. On appeal this decision was reversed on the ground
that the body in question was not a partnership but an unincorporated
company. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 855.
'
0 See Matter of Elmsford Country Club, (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 50 F. (2d)
238, 239. This club was organized under the Membership Corporations
Law of New York.
1Matter of Carthage Lodge, No. 365, I. 0. 0. F., (D.C. N.Y. 1916)
230 Fed. 694. This lodge was incorporated under the Benevolent Orders
Law of New York.
2See footnote 7 and text material there noted.
"In re Sargent Lumber Co., (D.C. Ark. 1923) 287 Fed. 154.
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fortiori after 1926 a business trust should have been entitled to
adjudication in bankruptcy, and, since 1934, to relief under section
77B. Moreover, business trusts have frequently been held to be
unincorporated companies subject to adjudication under section
4b.14 The amended definition of "corporations" would conse-
quently include business trusts in each of two separate phrases.
"Unincorporated companies and associations" is the most indefi-
nite category of "corporations" under the Bankruptcy Act. Only
one case has arisen under section 77B which involved the problem
of what is included within this class. 15
That case involved a "co-operative country general merchandise
store," known by the ambiguous name of Poland Union. It was
not incorporated, but did business in accord with articles of asso-
ciation. It had a board of directors, officers, and standing com-
mittees. It accepted subscriptions to its capital in the form of
either trading or interest-bearing shares. The holders of interest-
bearing shares were protected from liability, but their share in the
profits was limited to lawful interest on their investment. There
were provisions for the transfer and withdrawal of shares, the
retirement of interest-bearing shares, and the continuation of the
"association" in case of the death of any member. The circuit
court of appeals directed its inquiry toward determining whether
the Poland Union was a joint-stock company, an unincorporated
company, or an association. It first concluded that the store was
a joint-stock association within the meaning of section 2 of the
New York General Associations Law. It proceeded, largely in
reliance on In re Tidewater Coal Exchange,6 to hold that the
Poland Union was entitled to relief under section 77B. It is worth
noting that in the Tidewater Coal Exchange Case a non-profit
organization for facilitating the movement of coal on wharves was
held to be a joint-stock company although it had no constitution,
no articles of association, no by-laws, and no capital or initiation
fee or assessments. The attitude of the court in the Poland Union
Case indicates that such an organization as the Tidewater Coal
Exchange would be entitled to relief under section 77B.
14In re Associated Trust, (D.C. Mass. 1914) 222 Fed. 1012; In re
Parker, (D.C. Il1. 1921) 275 Fed. 868, reversed because of the complaint's
indefiniteness, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1921) 283 Fed. 404; Gallagher v. Hannigan,
(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 171, dismissed for want of jurisdiction in
a per curiam decision, (1927) 273 U. S. 667, 47 Sup. Ct. 470, 71 L. Ed. 830.15In re Poland Union, C.C.H. Bankruptcy Service, par. 3313. (D.C.
N.Y., Jan. 10, 1935). Reversed in (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 855.
'
8In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1922) 280 Fed.
638. Cert. denied (1922) 259 U. S. 584, 42 Sup. Ct. 587, 66 L. Ed, 1075.
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In In re Poland Union the lower court had held that on the
same facts the debtor was a partnership, 17 and, as has already been
noted, that a partnership was not eligible for relief. The two
decisions in that case seem to show that the primary problem for
the courts will be in each case to determine whether, on the facts
before them, they are dealing with a partnership or an entity
within the meaning of "corporations." Only the latter is eligible
for relief under section 77B.
Does the phrase "unincorporated companies and associations"
include non-profit enterprises as well as those organized for gain,
and social as well as business associations? The Tidewater Coal
Exchange was entirely non-pecuniary with respect to all save the
railroads who paid its expenses. Its members, coal-shippers and
consignees, had to contribute no capital; it had no profits; nor
even any income; yet it was held to be within the term "unincor-
porated company" as used in section 4b.18 The court in the Poland
Union Case held that non-profit associations may also have relief
under section 77B. That decision was undoubtedly correct in the
light of the decisions under section 4, but the constant references
in section 77B to creditors and stockholders as if they were the
only interested parties provide strong reason for arguing that the
Corporate Reorganizations Act was intended to apply only to
organizations doing business for profit.
The courts were hesitant, prior to 1934, to include other com-
panies than those with a "business" purpose within the phrase
"unincorporated company" in section 4b.19 As has already been
noted, a golf club operated solely for the recreation of its members
was said to be entitled to relief as an incorporated "corporation.1
2 0
It is submitted that unincorporated "corporations" should likewise
be interpreted to include social and charitable and educational as
well as business enterprises. The perpetuation of the former is
at least as vital to the community as the rehabilitation of the latter.
It should also be noted that the definition of corporations is broader
than the phrase "unincorporated company" in section 4b which the
cautious courts above referred to were construing. It includes
"unincorporated companies and associations."21 The word "asso-
'
7In re Poland Union, (D.C. N.Y. Jan. 10, 1935). C. C. H. Bankruptcy
Service, par. 3313.181n re Tidewater Coal Exchange, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1922) 280 Fed.
638. Cert. denied (1922) 259 U. S. 584, 42 Sup. Ct. 587, 66 L. Ed. 1075.191n re Order of Sparta, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 235.
20See Matter of Elmsford Country Club, (D.C. N.Y., 1931) 50 F. (2d)
238. 21Section 1(6) found in (1926) 44 Stat. at L. 662, 11 U. S. C. A. sec.
"CORPORATIONS" ELIGIBLE FOR 77B
ciations" does not connote a business enterprise as does the word
"companies." Whether incorporated or not it would seem, in con-
clusion, that "corporations" should be entitled to relief regardless
of their profit or non-profit character, or their social, charitable,
educational or business purpose.
22
Section 4 which, as has been seen, 23 is, except in the case of
railroads, determinative of what corporations may have relief under
section 77D, specifically denies the remedy of bankruptcy to
"municipal, . . . insurance," and "banking corporations" and
"building and loan associations" in either voluntary or involuntary
proceedings.
24
JA'unicipal corporations. The late section 80 of the Bankruptcy
Act2 5 was passed on May 24, 1934 to permit "municipal-debt
readjustments." It afforded relief not only to those political units
properly termed municipal corporations but also to all other politi-
cal subdivisions of the state.26  Since sections 773 and 80 were
1(6), (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 1(6), Supp. No.
3, 1932-34. Italics added.22Section 77B(a) provides that "Any corporation the majority of the
capital stock of which having power to vote for the election of directors
is owned, either directly or indirectly through an intervening medium, by
any debtor, or substantially all of whose properties are operated by such
debtor under lease or operating agreement, may file,... a petition". (1934)
48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 207(a), Supp., 1934. Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(a) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34). There have been no
cases which have discussed what corporations are included within this
provision. It has been suggested however that the above words should be
limited in their scope to stock corporations which are subsidiaries of debtor
corporations. Weinstein, Corporations Amenable to Section 77B, (1935) 83
U. Pa. L. Rev. 853, 871.23See footnotes 2 and 3.24Section 77B (a) provides that "any corporation" which is a subsidiary
of a corporation undergoing reorganization may file a petition, and also that
three or more creditors may file against "any corporation." 48 Stat. at L.
912, 913 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(a) (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S.
Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(a) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34). The use of the term$(any corporation" without qualification has raised the problem whether
insurance, banking, etc., corporations are amenable to the Act under such
circumstances. The same problem has arisen under section 77B(i) which
concerns the reorganization of "a corporation" already in the hands of a
receiver or trustee. (1934) 48 Stat. at. L. 920, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(i),
Supp., 1934. Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(i), Supp. No. 3, 1932-34.
Although no cases have discussed this problem, it has been suggested that
the exceptions should apply in all such situations. See Weinstein, Corpora-
tions Amenable to Section 77B, (1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853, 865, 872, and
873. 210n May 25 of this year the Supreme Court held section 80 unconsti-
tutional in a 5 to 4 decision. Ashton et al. v. Cameron County Water Im-
provement Dist. No. 1, (U.S. 1936) 56 Sup. Ct. 683.
26Section 80(a) found in (1934) 48 Stat. at. L. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. sec.
303(a) (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 303(a), (Supp. No.
3, 1932-34). It was there provided as follows: "Any municipality or other
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part of the same scheme for debtor relief any governmental unit
which was entitled to relief under section 80 would probably have
been classified as a municipal corporation and denied relief under
section 77B .2 7 The fact that section 80 was declared unconstitu-
tional did not enlarge the applicability of section 77B, but in a
close case the fact that no relief other than under section 77B is
open to a given debtor might incline a court toward holding that
the debtor is not a municipal corporation. With respect to the
mutual exclusiveness of sections 77B and 80 it is significant that
section 80 was law prior to the approval of section 77B by the
President.2 8  It is also worthy of note that the Sumners Bill, the
lineal ancestor of the Corporate Reorganizations Act, which was
introduced into Congress on January 23, 1933 specifically included
within its scope "drainage, irrigation, levee, sewer, and paving im-
provement districts established under the laws of the state of their
creation. ' 29  This provision was omitted from section 77B as
finally passed.
Railroad Corporations. It is important to note that section 4
of the Act does not control this exception. Section 77B affords
relief for "any railroad or other transportation corporation" ex-
cept a railroad more than 20% of the revenues of which are derived
from operations under the control of a municipality, 30 and railroads
entitled to relief under section 77, namely, those engaged in inter-
state commerce other than certain "street, suburban, or interurban
electric railway" systems.31 It seems, as a consequence of the
political subdivision of any state, including (but not hereby limiting the
generality of the foregoing) any county, city, borough, village, parish, town,
or township, unincorporated tax or special assessment district, and any
school, drainage, irrigation, reclamation, levee, sewer, or paving, sanitary,
port, improvement or other districts . .. may file a petition." See note 6
supra.
_
7 in this connection the reader should consider the language of the
court in In re North Kenmore Bldg. Corporation, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1936) 81
F. (2d) 656, set forth in footnote 8, supra.
28Section 80 was added to the Bankruptcy Act on May 24, 1934.
(1934) 48 Stat. at L. 798. Section 77B was approved on June 7, 1934. Hamil-
ton Gas Co. v. Watters, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 176.
29H. R. Rep. No. 1879, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 9649 (1933) p.
2, 16.3oSection 77B(a) and (n) found in (1934), 48 Stat. at L. 912 and 922,
11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 207(a) and (n) (Supp,. 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
11, sec. 207(a) and (n) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34).
BISection 77B (a) excepts from the operation of the section "a railroad
corporation authorized to file a petition or answer under the provisions of
section 77 of this Act." Section 77(a) found in (1933), 47 Stat. at L.
1474, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 205(a) (Supp., 1934) Mason's U. S. Code, tit.
11, sec. 205(a) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34) allows "any railroad corporation" to
file a petition. Section 77(r), found in (1933), 47 Stat. at L., 1482, 11 U. S.
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recent amendments, that any railroad may have its debts readjusted
in bankruptcy under section 77 or 77B, depending on its nature,
with the important exception indicated above of railroads under
the control of municipalities.32
Insurance Corporations. The variety of businesses which at the
present time issue insurance against any of a host of contingencies
has made the construction of "insurance company" more than
ordinarily difficult.
Most, if not all, companies which engage in or intend to engage
in an insurance business are chartered under special state statutes
which provide for their regulation and limit their powers. The
problem therefore arises whether the powers so conferred on
them, or their activities, or the class in which they are placed by
the state of incorporation, should determine their classification.
On Dec. 1, 1934 the district court for the Northern District of
New York decided that the New York Title and Mortgage Co.,
was an insurance company, and regretfully denied it relief under
section 77B.3 3 The court first listed the sections of the Insurance
Law of New York under which it was originally incorporated and
later merged, and the articles of the Banking Law under which
the company with which it had merged was organized. After list-
ing the powers conferred by those laws the court said, "The in-
comes received from the various activities of the debtor are, doubt-
less, the controlling factor in determining whether the debtor
comes under section 77B."3 4  Judge Cooper then set forth a
detailed account of the income received during 1930, and decided
that at least three-fourths of it was received from insurance activi-
ties, namely "the insuring of title, the guaranteeing of mortgages
and mortgage certificates, and things incidental thereto."' , The
court concluded as to this phase of the case:
C. A. sec. 205 (r) (Supp., 1934), Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 205 (r), Supp.
No. 3, 1932-34- defines a railroad corporation as "any common carrier by
railroad engaged in the transportation of persons or property in interstate
commerce, except a street, suburban, or interurban electric railway which
is not operated as a part of a general railroad system of transportation or
which does not derive more than 50 per centum of its operating revenues
from the transportation of freight in standard steam railroad freight equip-
ment."32For a further discussion of this exception see Weinstein, Corporations
Amenable to Section 77 B, (1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853, 866.331n re New York Title and Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y., 1934) 9 F.
Supp. 319.341n re New York Title and Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 9 F.
Supp. 319, 324.35In re New York Title and Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 9 F.
Supp. 319, 325.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"While neither its certificate of incorporation nor its super-
vision by the superintendent [of Insurance] is conclusive as to the
nature of the business, the fact that little other than insurance busi-
ness is shown seems to make the matter quite clear that it was an
insurance company." 36
Four months later an appeal from an order dismissing the peti-
tion of the Union Guarantee and Mortgage Company was taken
to the circuit court of appeals for the Second Circuit. The dis-
tinguished court which decided the case consisted of Judges
Learned Hand, Swan, and Augustus Hand. In a concise but
profound opinion it was held that since the debtor was incorpor-
ated under the Insurance Law of New York it could not seek
relief under section 77B.3 7
The court first examined the purpose of Congress in except-
ing municipal, railroad, insurance, and banking corporations, and
building and loan associations from the general terms of section
4. "From such similarity as exists between the excepted groups"
the court inferred that those classes were excepted which, because
of the public interest involved, required public supervision and
control; that Congress excepted these businesses because it "meant
to leave to local winding up statutes the liquidation of such com-
panies ;" that Congress intended the states by their regulatory acts
to determine the specific kinds of business which should be included
within these five exceptions. The court thus concluded that "it is
the powers conferred upon the company, not its activities which
are decisive." With regard to the Union Guarantee and Mortgage
Company it was said: "The state has chosen to regard it so [as
an insurance company], and that is all we may ask."
Three months later the same court, with Judge Manton sitting
in place of judge Learned Hand, reached the contrary result with
respect to the Prudence Co., Inc., but followed the same tech-
nique. 88
The Prudence Co., was incorporated under the investment
company article of the Banking Law of New York but had power
to guaranty mortgages which it sold. It was held not to be an
insurance company in spite of this power. The court said:
361n re New York Title and Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 9 F.
Supp. 319, 325.
37In re Union Guarantee and Mortgage Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935)
75 F. (2d) 984 affirming (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 281. Writ of cer-
tiorari denied, (1935) 296 U. S. 594, 56 Sup. Ct. 108, 80 L. Ed. 109. Noted
in (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 608.38In re Prudence Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 77
affirming (D.C. N.Y., 1935) 10 F. Supp. 33. Writs of certiorari denied,
(1935) 296 U. S. 646.
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"the state has not classified the debtor as an insurance company,
since it was not organized under the Insurance Law, and conse-
quently we cannot, consistently with In re Guarantee and Mortgage
Co.... hold the debtor exempt from bankruptcy as an insurer. ' 39
The court followed the state's classification of the company al-
though it had power to issue insurance at least incidentally to its
other powers. This case leads to the conclusion that it is not the
activities nor the powers which are conclusive, but the classifica-
tion adopted by the state of incorporation which determines whether
a company is outside the scope of section 77B.
This result necessarily means that what is an insurance com-
pany in one state might not be such in another. That does not
make the technique adopted in the Union Guarantee and Prudence
Cases bad however, since in almost all if not all states insurance
companies, as defined by the local laws, are subject to rehabilitation
under state law, and other corporations are within section 773.
Those corporations to which the state procedure is adapted may
be doctored by the state's specialists. Those which have no local
relief may go to the federal general practitioner. Such a result is
consistent with the purpose of the insurance corporation exemp-
tion as set forth above.
The Union Guarantee and Prudence test of classification is
especially satisfactory because of its simplicity as compared with
classification according to sources of income or activities. Whether
proceedings are instituted by the debtor or its creditors, it will
probably be desired to attempt another means of rehabilitation if the
debtor is an insurance company excluded from the benefits of
section 773. This clear test is of decided benefit to all parties con-
cerned for it makes it possible more definitely to know in advance,
without protracted hearings, whether the debtor will be admitted
to the corporate Valhalla.40 Expediency is vital in the field of
corporate reorganizations. The fewer the uncertainties as to which
route it may follow, the more opportunity there is for a corporation
or its creditors to seek the shortest road to rehabilitation.
Are fraternal benefit societies insurance companies? Two such
organizations which met the benefit claims by assessments on other
members were held not to be insurance companies and adjudicable
89In re Prudence Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 77, 80.
4OValhalla is defined as "The hall of Odin, into which he received the
souls of heroes slain in battle." Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 3d Ed.,
Merriam Series, 1924. The propriety of the appellation depends no doubt
on the critic's point of view.
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in bankruptcy.4 In the case of the Order of Sparta the court
said:
"The Order is not an insurance company, and does not do an
insurance business; the essential difference between its beneficiary
or so-called insurance contracts and the policies of regular insur-
ance companies being that its pecuniary benefits are met by assess-
ments paid by the members, these assessments being the chief and
practically the only asset of the Order.
'42
District Judge Dooling, in the opinion which subjected the Grand
Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen to the tragic
ending of bankruptcy, said:
"As a matter of fact it did not insure. Its only obligation was
to collect, from such of its members as were willing to contribute,
funds with which, if and when collected, it would pay certain
amounts to the beneficiaries of deceased members." 43
The Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity was a corpora-
tion which changed its purpose from "Masonic benevolence" to
"mutual insurance pure and simple." It developed from a fraternal
organization somewhat like the Grand Lodge or the Order of Spar-
ta into a business which issued certificates like insurance policies
to persons selected according to the usual standards of insurance
regulations. It received fixed dues determined as premiums are
determined, and promised the full payment of stated sums. The
court did not hesitate to hold that the Lodge was an insurance
company and not within the scope of the Bankruptcy Act.4" These
cases indicate that whether benefits are to be treated like insur-
ance depends on the particular facts of each case. It would avoid
adding another "question of degree" to the uncertainties of the
law, if the doctrine of the Union Guarantee and Prudence Cases
were extended to apply to this situation. If that were done the
states' classification of benefit societies as insurance companies or
in a separate category would be determinative. As yet no cases
have arisen under section 77B which involve this particular prob-
lem.
The question has, however, already come up in several cases,
whether a company which once admittedly operated as an insur-
ance company ceased to be such when it went into the hands of a
41In re Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, (D.C. Cal.
1916) 232 Fed. 199. Cf. In re Order of Sparta, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1917) 242
Fed. 235.42In re Order of Sparta, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 235, 237.
43In re Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, (D.C. Cal.
1916) 232 Fed. 199.4 4In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity, (D.C. Ga. 1923) 286
Fed. 180.
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receiver or state superintendent of insurance. The basis for the
contention that such a company is no longer an insurance cor-
poration is that the new manager of its affairs usually stops the
issue of policies and other normal activities of an insurance com-
pany, and merely manages investments and business operations
preparatory to winding up the business. It has been uniformly
decided that such a corporation is still an insurance company
within the terms of the Act.45
In the Peoria Life Insurance Co. Case the court pointed out
that the control and management of investments was a major func-
tion of an insurance business. It declared that if the company was
no longer operating as an insurance company, the court was at
a loss to know by what authority it acted at all. The court, in the
New York Title and Mortgage Case, indicated that Congress could
not have intended that insurance companies should be within the
scope of section 77B only when they were so greatly disturbed
in a prior proceeding as to have their character changed, for it
was the purpose of the section to permit reorganizations with as
little dislocation as possible. It might be added that if the reason
for the exclusion of insurance companies was that state agencies
were better qualified to conduct rehabilitation proceedings, the
one time when such companies should not be eligible for relief in
bankruptcy is when they are already in the hands of the superin-
tendent of insurance. The conclusion of the courts was succinctly
stated in the National Surety Co. Case:
"The character of a corporation does not change while being ad-
ministered by a court. Even though, during the period of rehabilita-
tion or liquidation, it ceases some or all of its former activities,
yet its classification remains the same."4
As in so many statutes, the provisos in section 77B cause
much of the uncertainty in its construction. This is very likely
because they are added in most cases after the act as a logical unit
has been drafted. Section 77B (a) provides that any corporation
may file an original petition or a petition "in any proceeding pend-
ing in bankruptcy, whether filed before or after this section be-
comes effective, provided the present operations of such corpora-
tion do not exclude it hereunder. '47 In both the Peoria and New
-1In re Peoria Life Insurance Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d)
777, writ of certiorari denied, (1935) 296 U. S. 594, 56 Sup. Ct. 108, 80
L. Ed. 109; In re National Surety Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 959;
In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 319.40In re National Surety Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 959, 961.
47Section 77B(a) found in (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
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York Title and Mortgage Cases it was contended that this "pres-
ent operations" clause should be the means of including the in-
surance companies within the scope of section 77B. Both courts
rejected the contention because the phrase was said to be designed
to exclude corporations otherwise included rather than to include
corporations otherwise excluded. The court in the latter case fur-
ther limited the clause to cases where the debtor's petition was
filed in a proceeding pending in bankruptcy. In that case there
was a creditors' petition and no proceeding pending in bankruptcy.
There have been frequent expressions of dissatisfaction with
the exclusion of insurance companies from the operation of the
Act.48 In the New York Title and Mortgage Case the court dis-
missed the petition "with regret," "for the superiority of section
77B for reorganization of the debtor corporation with its ramifica-
tions in many states is manifest. ' 49 That corporation did business
in twenty-five states. Since a business area covering many states
is characteristic of insurance corporations, the extension of sec-
tion 77B to include them would at least centralize their reorganiza-
tion.
In all cases involving insurance companies, it is debatable
whether the state procedure is sufficiently better adapted to the
rehabilitation of debtor corporations to make up for the broader
powers and wider jurisdiction of the federal courts under section
77B. If it be conceded that the balance is in favor of the state
modes of relief where specially designed to treat insurance cor-
porations, then the exclusion of them from the benefits of sec-
tion 77B is justified.
On the other hand if this is not conceded then the Act should
be amended to include insurance corporations within its scope.
If it were so amended the courts should be encouraged or re-
quired to refuse their approval of petitions filed by debtor cor-
porations unless they dearly proved the "need for relief" under
section 77B as distinguished from relief under state laws.50 The
Sec. 207(a) (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(a) (Supp.
No. 3, 1932-34).480n March 28, 1935 Senator Walsh of Massachusetts introduced an
amendment to section 77B to afford its remedies to title and mortgage
companies. 79 Cong. Rec., March 28, 1935, at 4581.
49See In re New York Title and Mortgage Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934)
9 F. Supp. 319, 329. See also In re National Surety Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1934) 7 F. Supp. 959, 961.
5oSection 77B (a) requires that a debtor state facts in its petition or
answer showing the "need for relief under this section"; and that the peti-
tion be approved only if the court is satisfied that the "petitions or answer
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Act does not require that a creditor's petition state facts show-
ing the "need for relief."5' 1 Such a requisite might well be added
to the section to cover this situation. But even if such a change
were not made, the courts could hold that a creditors' petition was
not filed in "good faith" where they did not show a need for re-
lieving the debtor insurance company in the federal rather than the
state courts.5 2 Two courts have already reached this result in cases
which did not involve insurance companies. 3
Here, as throughout the Corporate Reorganizations Act, there
would be grave danger of so overburdening the federal courts with
a mass of detailed work, both judicial and administrative, that they
would be unable to do justice in any case. That danger might here,
as elsewhere, be avoided by the appointment of Masters to de-
termine whether the allegation of the "need for relief" is sustained
by the facts, or whether the petition is filed in "good faith" as
judged by the necessity for relief in bankruptcy, in preference to
the mode afforded insurance companies by state laws.5 4
complied with this section." (1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. sec.
207(a) (Supp., 1934). Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11 sec. 207(a) (Supp. No.
3, 1932-34).
r'Section 77B(a) found in (1934) 48 Stat. at. L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) (Supp., 1934). 'Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(a) (Supp.
No. 3, 1932-34).
r2Section 77B (a) provides that a creditors' petition shall be approved
only if the court is "satisfied that it ... has been filed in good faith."
(1934) 48 Stat. at L. 912. 11 U. S. C. A. see. 207(a). Supp. 1934. Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 207(a) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34).53In re Laclede Gas Light Company, (D.C. Mo. June 26, 1934)
C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service, par. 3001; In re Texas Gas Utilities Com-
pany, (D.C. Tex. August 13, 1934) C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service, par.
3014.54Section 77B(c) (11) provides that "Upon approving the petition or
answer or at any time thereafter the judge, . . .may refer any matters
to a special master, who may be one of the referees in bankruptcy, for con-
sideration and report either generally or upon specified issues.' (1934)
48 Stat. at L. 915-917, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207(c) (11) (Supp., 1934),
Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 2 07(c) (11) (Supp. No. 3, 1932-34). It
might be argued that this clause precludes the use of special masters by
the judge to aid in determining whether the petition should be approved.
However "judge" is used in section 77B (c) advisedly to prevent the delega-
tion of the control of the debtor's property to a referee. Hearings before
the Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 1670 etc. and H. R. 5009, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) p. 192. In section 77B(a) it is the court which
must be satisfied that the petition was filed in good faith or that the need
for relief was proved. "Court" might be interpreted to include special
masters appointed to aid the judge in reaching his decisions. In the light
of the importance of a thorough investigation of the status of the debtor
before a petition is approved or dismissed, it is to be hoped that the latter
view will be adopted, and that the judges will be permitted to be assisted by
special masters from the start of proceedings under section 77B. A master
was appointed for the purpose of determining whether a petition should be
apnroved in In re Missouri Kansas Pipe Line Company, (D.C. Ill. Sept. 12,
1934) C. C. H. Bankruptcy Service, par. 3061 (Referee's Opinion).
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Banking Corporations. What has been said with regard to the
reason for excluding insurance corporations from the operation of
the Act, the basis for classifying a company as an insurance cor-
poration, and the propriety of excluding insurance companies from
the benefits of section 77B, applies with equal force to banking
corporations.
The only case to date which involved the classification of an
alleged banking corporation is worthy of note, for it indicates
some of the special problems relating to banks. The Prudence Co.,
was incorporated under the article of the Banking Law of New
York which relates to investment companies. Its business consisted
of the sale of mortgages and guaranties of payment. The circuit
court of appeals for the second circuit judged the status of the
Prudence Co., in the light of its classification by the state rather
than on the basis of its activities. It determined that the debtor
was not a banking corporation, by using the same technique by
which it determined what are insurance corporations."
The court pointed out that the Banking Law of New York
was entitled "'An Act in relation to banking corporations . . .
and corporations under the supervision of the banking depart-
ment.' ,,56 It concluded from this title that all corporations or-
ganized under this law were not treated by the state as bank-
ing corporations, and that safe deposit and investment compa-
nies were not included in the phrase "banking corporations." The
court reached this conclusion at least with respect to investment
companies, because they do not have power to receive deposits,
"which is generally recognized as the essential characteristic of a
banking business. ' ' 57 The Prudence Co., could not have been a
bank under this test because first, a New York statute required
an institution which received deposits to place securities with the
superintendent of banks, which the Prudence Co., had not done;
and second, a New York statute forbade any investment company
which had preferred stock outstanding to receive deposits. The
debtor had such an issue outstanding.
Under section 4b "any unincorporated company, and any
moneyed" etc., corporation, except a banking etc., corporation,
could be adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt. Private bankers,
551n re Prudence Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 77 af-
firming (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 33. Writs of certiorari denied (1935)
296 U. S. 646.
_5In re Prudence Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 77, 79.571n re Prudence Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 77, 79.
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doing business as unincorporated companies, were therefore eligible
for relief.r8 Now the case is different. Unincorporated companies
are within the scope of section 77B only as they are included
within the definition of "corporations." The banking corporation
exception applies to unincorporated companies as well as to in-
corporated "corporations." It therefore appears that private bank-
ers are not eligible for relief under section 77B, at least where
classified as bankers by the State.
Building and Loan Associations are expressly placed without
the scope of section 77B.9
Dissolved Corporations. The cases indicate that a dissolved
corporation is entitled to relief under section 77B whenever it
could have had such relief as a going concern.
Two cases have raised this point before the district court for
the eastern district of Illinois. In both it was held that dissolution
did not terminate the court's jurisdiction under section 77B.60 An
Illinois statute provided that dissolution of a corporation did not
impair remedies against it for liabilities incurred previous to dis-
solution, if suit were brought and process served within two years
after dissolution."' The dissolution of a corporation under similar
statutes was no bar to proceedings in bankruptcy prior to the ad-
dition of section 77B to the Bankruptcy Act. 62
In its opinion in the 211 East Delaware Case the court did not,
however, rely on this statute, but relied on the more general propo-
sition that the dissolution of a corporation should not deprive the
federal courts of their paramount power over the administration,
liquidation, and distribution of the property of a corporation. It
58See In re Sage, (D.C. Mo. 1915) 224 Fed. 525, 537; affirmed in(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1916) 236 Fed. 644.
5'Section 77B(a), found in (1934) 48 Stat. at. L. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
sec. 207(a) Supp., 1934. Section 4 found in (1932) 47 Stat. at. L. 47, 11
U. S. C. A. sec. 22 (Supp., 1934) Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 22 (Supp.
No. 3, 1932-34).
GOIn re Surf Building Corp., (D.C. Ill. Oct. 17, 1934) C. C. H. Bank-
ruptcy Service, par. 3076. In re 211 East Delaware Place Building Corp.,
(D. C. Ill. 1934), 7 F. Supp. 892 affirmed in (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 76
F. (2d) 834. Noted in (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 108.
61"The dissolution, for any cause whatever, of any corporation, shall
not take away or impair any remedy given against such corporations, its
officers, or stockholders, for any liabilities incurred previous to its dis-
solution, if suit therefor is brought and service of process had within two
years after such dissolution." Illinois Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) ch.
32, No. 79.
Ol White Mountain Paper Co. v. Morse & Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1904)
127 Fed. 643; In re Munger Vehicle Tire Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1908) 159
Fed. 901; In re Double Star Brick Co., (D.C. Cal. 1913) 210 Fed. 980;
Partan v. Niemi, (1934) 288 Mass, 111; 192 N. E. 527.
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quoted Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F. (2d) 592 (C.C.A.
4th, 1932) to the effect that:
"'It has . .. been the view of the courts that the National
Bankruptcy Act so far controls the dissolution of an insolvent
corporation as to prevent its legal extinction by superseding, at
least temporarily and to the extent necessary, all state laws which
would prevent the creditors from having the assets of insolvent
debtors administered in accordance with the terms of the federal
act. It has been thought that to hold otherwise would be to allow
the states, by a particular form of legislation, or by the action
of their courts, to override a law of Congress on a subject over
which the constitution has given to Congress supreme power.' "3
The National Surety Co., was dissolved pursuant to the terms
of the Insurance Law of New York. By virtue of that statute
dissolution of the company vested the superintendent of insurance
with title to all the property, contracts and rights of action of the
insurer.64 The court declared that it had no jurisdiction under sec-
tion 77B because first, the debtor was an insurance corporation,
and second, title to all the debtor's property has passed to the
superintendent of insurance.65
The second basis for the result reached in the National Surety
Case would be inconsistent with the language used in the 211 East
Delaware Case were it not for the fact that the corporation in the
former case was an insurance company, outside the scope of the
Act. There was thus no possibility of a jurisdictional conflict be-
tween state and federal courts. If all divesting dissolution statutes
are limited to companies, such as insurance corporations, which are
excluded from the operation of the Act, dissolution might be given
as an additional reason for not admitting a corporation to relief
under section 77B, without endangering the operation of that law.
On the contrary, if divesting dissolution statutes are passed to
apply to corporations within the scope of section 77B, they should
not be given the effect indicated in the National Surety Case. The
court there justified its second basis for the decision by stating that
all earlier cases which had allowed bankruptcy proceedings against
a dissolved corporation arose in states where the statutes allowed
dissolution only for limited purposes, and thereby indicated its
63See In re 211 East Delaware Place Building Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1934)
7 F. Supp. 892, 894, affirmed in (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 834.
14"The superintendent and/or his successors shall be vested by opera-
tion of law with the title to all the property, contracts and rights of action
of such insurer as of the date of the order so directing them to liquidate."
New York Insurance Law, (McKinney's Supp., 1935) Sec. 404.
65In re National Surety Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 959.
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conviction that absolute dissolution should in all cases be a bar
to subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.6 This was not true in at
least one earlier case where the Maryland statute terminated the
corporation for all purposes and vested title to its property in a
receiver. The court there held that dissolution under the statute
was no bar to subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy. It declared
that the federal bankruptcy power was paramount, and superseded
all state insolvency laws inconsistent therewith; that even though
an insolvent corporation had been technically dissolved for all
purposes, still its affairs were subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 7 Because an insurance company was involved, the
National Surety Case was probably rightly decided on its facts,
but the second reason given for the decision should not be a bar to
a corporation otherwise eligible to relief. If the uniformity of our
bankruptcy system is to remain a fact no such simple device as
technical dissolution should be allowed to supplant the federal
jurisdiction with that of the states.
011n re National Surety Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 959, 961.
67Lyon Realty Co. v. Milburn Realty Co., (D.C. Md. 1932) 56 F. (2d)
187, affirmed in Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1932) 59
F. (2d) 592.
